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Europe, China and Security Governance: is there evidence of normative convergence?  




Normative power can be defined as the ability to govern interdependencies by means of 
rules, regimes and compliance strategies. This paper presents two case studies in security 
governance - international responsibility to protect in Sudan and counter-proliferation 
policies towards Iran’s nuclear programme - to evaluate the degree of normative 
convergence between China and Europe. It concludes that there are still major differences  
between Europe and China on employing normative strategies in security governance but 
that both modes of governance and identities as security actors are mobile so that the 




In both Europe and China there is now a great deal of attention being paid to normative 
power, and the related idea of soft power, though it seems their perception of this form of 
politics differs considerably. In Europe normative power is strongly associated with the 
ability to exert authority without the use of force so that the European mode of security is 
predicated on normative objectives like good governance, human rights, and ultimately an 
international society that has democratic politics as its common identity (ESS, 10; 
Manners, 2008). In China normative power has more to do with cultural soft power than 
with formal norms (Hu, 2011). This is still a claim of authority by means of identity, but 
authority embodied in China’s self-conception as a civilization experiencing revival by 
rapid power modernisation. This difference in the understanding of normative power - 
what it is and how it relates to external strategies - is of rising significance because of 
geopolitical changes in Europe-China relations. The Europe-China relationship is only in 
part a bilateral relationship now and increasingly involves complex engagements in 
different issue areas and geopolitical contexts. In the past many of the issue areas were 
global level - climate change, trade and knowledge regimes - but regional engagements are 
quickly rising in prominence. Thus it is appropriate to conduct analysis to test the degree 
of convergence or otherwise in the normative power assumptions of Europe and China - 
the significance of norms and rules, the viability and desirability of regimes, and the 
possibilities and limits of compliance strategies in international society. To do this, this 
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paper will examine the most important, but arguably most difficult, aspect of normative 
interdependence, that of security governance.  
 Both China and Europe are concentrating on the range of security issues they 
confront. Europeans call this range national and human security, and the Chinese 
traditional and non-traditional security. To date they have limited experience of working 
together across a broad range of governance issues in either traditional or non-traditional 
security. This lack of shared experience is partly conditioned by the recent emergence of 
Europe and China in the fields of security governance; but also by the differences in certain 
core assumptions, of which the most significant is interventionism. China views the UN, 
and certain other core international institutions such as the IAEA, as being the only bodies 
that can endorse intervention in hard or soft terms - by force or by norms. China also pays 
significant attention to the views of regional bodies when deciding its position: China tends 
to view regional conflicts as falling within a certain purview to be arbitrated by regional 
organisations, if they choose to exert such a role. Europe on the other hand is often 
focussed on normative intervention: it sees the resolution of security issues as generating a 
requirement for compliance. This compliance may occasionally require force but more 
often it is established through obligation to regimes and the deployment of sanctions 
against those who will not comply with regimes. It would be wrong, however, to suggest 
that this is an impassable difference between Europe and China.1 China has, for example, 
been largely supportive of the hard and soft intervention in Afghanistan given the scale of 
international criminality being organised there. China’s concern with interventionism is 
that it is too often the default approach of the Western countries rather than one reserved 
for exceptional international risks such as that posed by Afghanistan. Therefore it is the 
frequency of intervention and the selection of cases for intervention on which European 
governments and the Chinese government tend to differ. This said, China’s posture on 
intervention is changing as its international commitments rise and with its awareness of 
the nature of security interdependence: China’s willingness to modify non-intervention 
norms is frequently correlated to perceptions of how a security risk may impact on China’s 
own interests (Gill and Small, 2012: 27-32). Therefore, the potential for security 
convergence between Europe and China tends to arise where either a) the cooperation has 
been endorsed by the UN or some other accepted international or regional body, such as 
counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea; or b) where European or Chinese security 
                                                 
1 For discussions of China’s movement away from rigid sovereigntism and towards the notion of 
international responsibility, see Carlson (2011) and Zhu (2010: 40-47).  
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interests require that they engage around the security issue - the nature of the problem and 
what should be done about it.   
 This paper will examine what is happening to European and Chinese perceptions of 
security governance, focusing on the role of normative power. It does this by presenting 
two case studies that examine normative dimensions of security governance. The first will 
be in the field of human/ non-traditional security examining the norm of responsibility to 
protect in Africa, with the problem of civil conflict in Sudan as the case. The second is in 
the field on national/ traditional security and takes the issue of nuclear proliferation as its 
focus, with Iran’s nuclear programme as the case. Each case will evaluate evidence of 
normative convergence. The tests for normative convergence that we will apply are:  
1. What is the degree of international responsibility in the case, and who gets to select the 
case?  
2. What is the appropriate response of international actors to the security issue: what is the 
range of response methods?  
3. What is an acceptable degree of intervention in normative power terms - to what degree 
should international actors be prepared to compel compliance on the dispute parties?  
 
Case Study 1: International responsibility in Africa and the Sudan case 
 
This case study applies the notion of responsibility to protect in Africa, with the problem of 
civil conflict in Sudan as the case. The UN, AU, IGAD (The Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development in Eastern Africa), the troika (UN, AU, and Arab League) and the 
international community as a whole have made many efforts to resolve the conflict in 
Sudan and facilitate post-war reconstruction in Sudan and the newly established South 
Sudan. However, the future of the two states remains uncertain and cannot be solved by 
any single stakeholder. Since each actor involved in Sudan has its own interests and 
perspectives, a collective effort rather than competitive interests is of great significance in 
providing some tangible commitments to the future of the two states. China, although it 
can hardly be considered a key player in Sudan, has drawn the world’s attention due to its 
controversial engagement in Darfur as well as its contribution to building new 
infrastructure. Therefore, the following case study will identify the similarity and 
differences between EU and China over the Sudan civil war by considering the norm of 
international responsibility to protect.  
 
Background introduction to the case: the Sudan crisis 
 4 
 
Sudan has suffered a 22-year civil war between north and south which has “left over two 
million Sudanese dead and uprooted millions more” (Large and Patey, 2011: 1). With the 
mediation of the UN, AU and the troika, Khartoum and The Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and 
conducted the referendum after six years of interim period. When the southern people had 
successfully voted for independence in 2011, the once largest, yet one of the least 
developed states in Africa, separated into two countries. However, this is not the end of the 
problems for the two countries as the demarcation of the border between north and south, 
the status of the three areas Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, and 
financial arrangements have distrubed the fragile peace from time to time. The tensions in 
Darfur remain unsolved. Oil-production, revenues and the use of the pipeline to Port 
Sudan continue to cause unrest. It can be said that the civil war in Sudan is so complicated 
due to factors such as the marginalized area and relations between peoples with a different 
ethnic, religious and tribal background who fight for key resources (oil and water) and 
freedom. These groups seek the support of respective stakeholders and need continuous, 
forceful, and collective engagement from the international community, otherwise, the state 
is in danger of secession and fragmentation. As an African academic, Dr. Abdurrahman 
Ahmed Osma, noted, “the south will go, Darfur needs a little push and will go, the Nuba 
Mountain will go, the Southern Blue Nile will go, the East will go away from Sudan” (cited 
in Johnson, 2011: 217). 
 Why have achievements and progress in conflict resolution been so limited despite 
the many international efforts? In the case of China, it lacks a clear, coherent and long-
term diplomatic strategy and is short of experience in cooperation with the Western 
countries. For Europe, its ideological method and use of sanctions has proved to be 
ineffective. China, has long adhered to the norms of non-interference, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and this meant it appeared a supporter of the Bashir government in 
Khartoum. The West has given dual reaction to China’s relations with Khartoum: on one 
hand, they are afraid it may undermine the efforts and sanctions made by the Western 
governments and provide Bashir an alternative sponsor, notably in finance and arms; on 
the other hand, they expect China to use its political influence to pressure Khartoum for a 
peaceful solution. In contrast, the close relationship with Sudan drew China into a dual 
dillemma. One is striking a balance between an old friend Khartoum and a new friend 
Juba. The other is the economic interest in Sudan versus Beijing’s desire for a responsible 
power image on the world stage.  As one Sudan professor pointed out China has been able 
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to out-compete Europe and America in gaining the hearts and minds of the people in 
Africa, because historically “while the West led by the USA and Europe cut off their aid 
relations with Sudan, China was more than ready to come in without any preconditions” 
(Sudan Tribune, 2007). Sudan is so desperately in need of funding, not only because of the 
humanitarian crisis there, but also because the newly separated governments have to show 
some improvements to meet the expectation of long suffering peoples and to prevent 
further unrest. Unfortunately, besides the pledges that did not come true, five years after 
the CPA only one third of the resources from Multi Donor Trust Fund have been spent, 
others remain on the MDTF account due to bank procedures (Johnson, 2011: 217).   
 
What is the nature and degree of international responsibility in Sudan? 
 
Sudan is a country where more than 2 million people lost their lives and 4.5 million people 
were forced to flee from their homes. In UN estimates, between January and August 2012 
political, inter-communal, and resource-driven clashes killed over 2,600 people (HRW, 
2012). Evidence also showed security forces fighting against armed militias who 
committed serious abuses against civilians. According to The Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2012 hundreds of civilians, including women and children, were killed, and tens of 
thousands of people were displaced, primarily in Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei states. 
Governments, opposition militants and soldiers have all failed to take adequate 
precautions to protect civilians. The Sudan situation no doubt falls under the principles of 
R2P which holds that where a state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and 
peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to 
intervene through coercive measures such as  sanctions. The UN, EU, AU, and US continue 
to intervene under the guideline of resolution 2046 (2012) and the AU road map (HRW, 
2012). But practically the conflict is escalating and humanitarian agencies still cannot meet 
the health, nutrition, and security needs of the displaced Sudanese and refugees caused by 
the conflicts.  
 In contrast, China has its own perception of international responsibility in the case 
of Sudan based on its diplomatic philosophy. As Loke (2009: 196) suggests, “China’s 
responsible behavior is driven more by an instrumental calculation of its national 
interests”. Although a doctrine of national interests seems to contradict with those of 
international obligations, constructivists argue that “changing international social 
structures……re-conceptualizes their interest” (Finnemore, 1996: 2-3). This means 
national interests are fluid and change over time through interaction with international 
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society. It partly explains why China’s attitude towards Darfur has undergone an evolution 
since 2007, from initially seeking to undermine international efforts to resolve the Darfur 
and South Sudan crises to subsequently putting pressure on Khartoum to engage with the 
international community (Taylor, 2009: 50-54). In this case, before considering China’s 
engagement in Sudan, it is necessary to evaluate China’s national interests in the Sudan 
case.  
 China has three national interests in Sudan, the first of which is the political 
interest. Khartoum, China’s old friend, like many of other African states, has great 
significance because of China’s political objectives. That is to say, African states always 
serve as diplomatic alliances on the world stage, a follower in international institutions and 
a supporter for the “One-China” policy. Second, China’s new engagement in South Sudan 
is largely driven by economic interests, such as  energy supply and access to the Sudanese 
market, initially the arms market but evolving into infrastructure and service industry 
(ICG, 2012). Since energy security is the key to China’s sustainable economic growth  
securing this supply from Africa can be categorized as China’s national interest. At the 
same time the Chinese also have considerable commercial and financial interests ranging 
from restaurants, hotels to roads and buildings. Sudan’s imports from China in 2009 were 
valued at US$1,875.85 million (HoL, 2009). The third interest is China’s responsible great 
power image, that has risen in significance with China’s interaction with the international 
community: China’s self-identity has evolved from a poor developing country to a peaceful 
responsible power that promotes the peace and stability of other regions, including in 
Sudan. Based on the former three categories, it can be concluded that China’s national 
interests in Sudan have moved into line with the common interests of international society.  
 It can be said that the conflict in Sudan is a case that corresponds both with the 
normative principle of R2P and China’s view of its international responsibility. It provides 
a chance for intervention cooperation between China and Europe and the advantages of 
each in the following areas: reducing the war-affected consequences; facilitating talks and 
negotiations between North and South Sudan; pushing forward an understanding of 
Sudan’s ethnic and racial problems; and promoting the communication between Khartoum 
and relevant rebel groups.    
 As a result of these factors we can characterise the Chinese perspective on 
international responsbility in Sudan in the following ways. First it has to be recognised that 
China has faced an uncomfortable position in Sudan. China as a big investor in Sudan has 
inevitably been at the center stage, partly because its political and economic interests and 
partly due to the international demands that are made of it. Juba wanted Beijing to 
 7 
pressure Khartoum for a reasonable deal in the oil revenue distribution and better oil 
transportation cooperation; while the North relies on China to prevent South Sudan’s 
interest in new oil related infrastructure that might by-pass the exisitng route to the north. 
Many international actors expect China to intervene actively in the humanitarian crisis and 
provide ‘no-strings’ economic support, in contrast to western perspectives. These complex 
and contradictory demands place China in an uncomfortable position. China’s historical 
support for Khartoum made the South reluctant to trust Beijing; while the western 
countries accused Beijing of complicity with Bashir’s regime of human rights abuse and of 
passive reaction to the economic sanctions of the West.  
 How then does China hope to motivate Sudan in a Chinese way? China’s principle of 
non-intervention has long been seen as an obstacle for international humanitarian 
activism. Criticism considered non-intervention to be little more than an excuse for 
Beijing’s partnerships with pariah regimes and disinterest in human rights abuses that 
undermined the international efforts for promoting better governance. However, even if 
China still emphasises non-intervention in various circumstances, the norm of  
responsibility to protect has evolved. In order to implement the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, the UN authorized 1590 resolution under which the first peacekeeping forces 
entered Sudan. Beijing supported the resolution and sent its first group with a engineer 
corps of 275 people, transportation corps of 100 and medical corps of 60 to the area. This 
commitment has become the longest one in China’s peacekeeping history. China also 
widely worked to develop infrastructure in Sudan, such as bridge and roads building, 
airport maintaining, water supply system repairing, electronic supply, transportation of 
personnel and materials, casualty treatment and public health. On 16th January, 2011, 
despite the close ties with Khartoum, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei 
immediately expressed Beijing’s welcome of the successful referendum and Peoples Daily 
also praised Khartoum for respecting local people’s own decision (MOFA, 2011). China also 
became one of the countries that established recognition of South Sudan at an early stage. 
Meanwhile, China continues to be a good funding source for an area in need of investment, 
loans and other financial support. Sudan’s heavy debt could not be solved in an effective 
way without China.  
 
Normative convergence and resolution of the Sudan case 
 
Therefore we can address the three research questions as follows:  
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 1. What is the degree of international responsibility in the case, and who gets to select 
the case? 
China’s attitude towards Sudan reflects three features of its interpretation of the 
international norm of responsibility. The first question is - who has the right to decide the 
case? For Western countries, what matters is not who has called the international 
community to become involved in a humanitarian case, as long as the situation is serious 
enough. But China always tends to support the decision when the case is defined by the UN 
or some regional institution. As Li Baodong (2012) pointed out China has always 
maintained that African issues should be settled by Africa in African ways. China 
commends and supports the unremitting efforts made by the African Union to promote the 
settlement of the issues between Sudan and South Sudan, and welcomes the roadmap 
adopted by the African Union in this regard. Taking into consideration the AU position on 
the situation between Sudan and South Sudan, China voted in favor of Security Council 
resolution 2046. During his speech, Li Baodong (MOFA, 2012) also highlighted that China 
has always maintained that the international community should take an objective, 
impartial and balanced position on Sudan and South Sudan, and avoid taking sides or 
imposing unbalanced pressure on the parties, and refrain from interfering in the 
mediation efforts of the African Union and other regional organizations and countries.  
2. What is the appropriate response of international actors to the security issue: what are 
the range of response methods?  
The second question is - what is an appropriate response to humanitarian crises? Here it 
must be noted that there is not an accepted defined scope of R2P and clearly the current 
categories of four crimes is too narrow. The human rights abuse issues are far more than 
the crimes listed in R2P. Chinese officials and scholars have debated the issues of  
sovereignty and R2P. Although they may agree that the international community has a 
responsibility to ensure standards for states’ behaviour, conservatives still considered 
inner governance as a domestic issue where only local people have the ulitimate rights.  
Plus the Chinese government is very cautious of military intervention not only because of 
its own one-party ruled system, but also because there is no solid evidence to support the 
success of military-led intervention. China prefers to focus on issues of post-conflict 
construction rather than military intervention, because they hold that the root of conflict is 
wealth sharing, and no improvement could be achieved in conditions of extreme poverty. 
 3. What is an acceptable degree of intervention in normative power terms - to what 
degree should international actors be prepared to compel compliance on the dispute 
parties? 
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The third question is - can the international community compel compliance and to what 
degree should the international actors intervene into the security dispute? While the 
Western counterparts paid more attention to institutional establishment, such as 
democracy, legal system, efficient and transparent governance, the Chinese have focused 
on development, such as infrastructure construction, economic packages and investment. 
The former approach requires sanctions and possibly even military intervention to force 
dispute parties to comply. In contrast, China considers the post-conflict construction as an 
economic development task. It places economic rights in front of political rights, because 
in China’s logic, hungry people need food first rather than voting. Therefore, they actively 
engaged in education, hospitals and roads building and only passively urged the recipient 
to improve its governance.    
 
Case study 2: International responsibility in counter-proliferation and the Iran case  
 
This second case study looks at the rising problems of sustaining counter-proliferation in 
the post-Cold war international order, looking at the most pressing case today: Tehran’s 
attempt to develop a nuclear weapons capacity.  This case is paradigmatic of the problems 
of counter-proliferation in the Second Nuclear Age (Bracken, 2003). In the first nuclear 
age - the Cold War - proliferation was based on dyadic deterrence between conventional 
superpowers. In the second nuclear age, which is strongly focused on Asia, we see 
multiple-player deterrence among states who are using nuclearisation as a mechanism of 
state construction and as a way of by-passing the complex barriers to conventional 
deterrence.   
 
What is the nature and extent of international responsibility over the Iran weapons 
programme?  
 
The international community has been relatively united in defending the non-proliferation 
regime and Chinese willingness to support the regime has increased in the post-Cold War 
period in line with its general integration into multilateral institutions. But China’s 
position on non-proliferation enforcement remains strongly shaped by its own strategic 
calculus: 
China’s nonproliferation agenda is not substantively different from that of other prominent 
supporters of the nuclear nonproliferation regime where horizontal proliferation is 
concerned, but the level of concern over particular issues is. The relative lack of Chinese 
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interest in dealing with what are regarded elsewhere as cases of considerable proliferation 
concern is the result of the perceived level of direct threat to China that these cases 
represent (Boutin, 2011: 358). 
Consensus on non-proliferation enforcement is now being strongly tested by the nuclear 
activities of Iran. Iran has had a long-standing interest in civil nuclear capacity going back 
to the era of the Shah. A significant change occurred in 1992 when Russia and Iran signed 
agreements to construct four Light Water Reactors. By the early 2000s Iran had achieved 
full-cycle capacity in nuclear fuels. In 2005 the IAEA made a report to the UNSC stating 
that Iran was in breach of inspection conditions under the NPT. The UNSC passed 
repeated resolutions after 2007 requiring Iran to suspend enrichment activities. Tehran 
refused and indeed expanded the number and quality of centrifuges employed in 
enrichment. Iran has defended these practices by stating that the NPT guarantees the 
rights of all states to peaceful use of nuclear energy and that a number of other countries 
that are ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ parties to the NPT, including Argentina, Brazil, Germany, 
Japan and the Netherlands have uranium-enrichment facilities, as well as the five ‘nuclear-
weapon’ parties to the NPT, and yet these countries do not face restrictions on their 
activities (Mousavian, 2012: 189). Despite these claims Iran has faced the toughest 
sanctions imposed on any country for breach of non-proliferation norms. These include 
unilateral US-imposed sanctions that date back to the 1979 crisis and now cover: non-
proliferation actions against those arming Iran; trade and investment restrictions; 
restrictions on sensitive materials; sanctions on financial dealings and asset holding; and 
restrictions on Iran’s ability to operate in fuels markets. Some of these sanctions by the US 
have been condemned by Russia and China as unfair restrictions on legitimate 
international commerce and likely to harm progress towards a negotiated settlement. 
Nevertheless international sanctions have continued to expand being undertaken by 
countries and regional organisations including the EU. The P5+Germany group convened 
by the European Union has conducted four negotiating rounds with Iran up to 2012 
without making much progress on their declared aim of ‘stop, shut and ship’: stop 
refinement, shut down processing, and ship uranium at over 20% refinement to accepted 
destinations, probably Russia. UN sanctions saw four rounds between 2006 and 2010. In 
November 2011 the IAEA issued its strongest statement to date on the military 
implications of Iran’s programme:  
 The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s 
nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive 
information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. 
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The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the 
development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior 
to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and 
that some activities may still be ongoing (IAEA, 2011: 10).  
In 2012 the European Union and the United States and a number of other countries 
including Japan and Canada further tightened the sanctions regime, targeting Iran’s 
international oil trade and its financial system (CFR, 2012).  Sanctions are now having a 
very evident effect on the Iranian economy and yet counter-proliferation experts continue 
to hold that sanctions alone will rarely halt nuclearisation if a regime is determined to 
proceed and perhaps has some external sponsors that will be willing to deflect some of the 
pressure.  This is the role that China played over DPRK nuclearisation but its behaviour 
over Iran has been much more nuanced and indeed continues to evolve.  
 China like Russia has very significant economic and strategic interests at stake over 
Iran, and West Asia more generally. Yet it is not possible to characterise China as a 
sanctions-buster on Iran so much as a sanctions-avoider. China continues to trade and 
invest in Iran having received waivers that allow it to do this. At the same time China has 
been very careful not to appear as any kind of sponsor to Tehran. This can be explained in 
four ways: 
a) China is more dependent on Arab oil than on Iranian energy and would not compromise 
its emerging strategic partnership with Arab countries to sponsor Iran: it makes no sense 
for China to make a host of enemies across the Middle East in order to gain one friend;  
b) Both in its unilateral and multilateral politics China has been careful to keep Tehran at 
arm’s length. President Ahmadinejad has tried to copy the Pakistani strategy of getting in 
under China’s wing, including through Shanghai Cooperation Organisation membership. 
But China has resisted since it does not wish to bring Tehran’s problems within its orbit;  
c) China wishes to defend its reputation as a responsible great power and that means 
upholding the NPT and following IAEA recommendations. It regards itself as having been 
consistent on this front and the US as having been highly inconsistent. Thus the US did not 
sanction India or Pakistan after 1998 nor did it not follow IAEA recommendations on 
Iraq’s weapons programme in 2002-03;  
d) On matters in the UNSC China follows an obvious track of triangulation between Russia 
and the US. From Libya to Syria to Iran the Chinese position is always in some part a sub-
equation of the Russian and American positions. China has been happy for the Kremlin to 
lead resistance to the military option on Iran just as China led this resistance on North 
Korea.    
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 The problem with these calculations is that they could yet culminate in Iran’s 
nuclearisation, which presents an even graver problem. Despite China and Russia’s 
opposition to the military option on Iran they are not in a position to halt this as they did 
over North Korea (Kerr, 2005). If sanctions fail then war is likely and this has major 
repercussions for Chinese economic and strategic interests in West Asia. In an article in 
2010 two Chinese analysts pointed out that if the United States succeeded in creating a 
pro-American regime in Iran, this would have very negative impacts for China given Iran’s 
location as “an important geopolitical fulcrum of the Middle East countries” (Wang and 
Xia, 2010). They advocated four principles for resolution: one, a negotiated settlement; 
two, respect for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy; three, Iran cannot have nuclear 
weapons (buneng yongyou hewuqi); four, reduce not escalate tension on the issue: 
 It is in all sides interest to prevent the nuclear crisis from going from bad to worse, 
from danger to conflict. To do this, on the one hand, cooperation should be 
strengthened with relevant countries to support Iran, to safeguard Iran's legitimate 
rights, including political, diplomatic, military equipment and technology relations 
in exchange for security interests in Iran's oil; on the other hand, it is necessary to 
deal with the United States, to let the United States know that the use of force 
cannot be relied on to solve all the problems in the world, and this will serve to 
improve the U.S. diplomatic strength and gambits in China's eyes.  
  Iran is one of the main means of access to energy, and therefore, China 
advocates resolving the Iranian nuclear issue in a peaceful manner as this accords 
with the fundamental interests of China. At the same time, to ensure the national 
stability and security of Iran is also of long-term strategic significance to China. If 
Europe and the United States go to war and gain a victory, Iran will become the 
second Iraq, and this will directly block China's energy access and contain China's 
development. 
However as this assessment was given in 2010 and no agreement seems closer, China’s 
insistence on a negotiated solution faces accusations that the Chinese are running a ‘dual 
game’ - using UNSC resolutions and 5+1 engagement to demonstrate China’s great power 
responsibility while defending its energy needs and buying time for Tehran’s weapons 
programme.2 At a press conference in Qatar in January 2012 following his visits to Saudi 
Arabia and UAE Premier Wen Jiabao was forced to defend China’s continuing economic 
relationship with Iran at the same time as offering an unusually vocal rejection of Iran’s 
                                                 
2 This is debated by John Garver (2011) who concludes that from ‘circumstantial evidence’ the 
charge of a dual game is correct. 
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nuclearisation. He said “China adamantly opposes Iran developing and possessing nuclear 
weapons," but also that China's oil trade with Iran is “normal trade activity," and that 
“legitimate trade should be protected, otherwise the world economic order would fall into 
turmoil" (Reuters, 2012a).  
 It can be seen that China’s commitment to non-proliferation is sincere but not so 
absolute a principle that it overrides national interests in energy security and defending 
the strategic status quo in West Asia. As such China’s Iran strategy also has to be seen in 
the context of Russian-Chinese defence of regime status quo from Damascus to Islamabad. 
This is a risky path for China to follow since it is clear that at some point the military 
option to at least punish Tehran, if not halt its activities, may become unavoidable. This 
would push the Middle East into a crisis that would have highly unpredictable outcomes, 
including for energy prices. 
 In contrast to China’s conditional sanctioning of Iran the European Union has now 
introduced restrictions that largely duplicate those of the United States.  According to the 
EU's trade commission, the EU27 was Iran’s largest export market in 2010 with €13bn of 
goods (17.8%); China was in second place with €12.5bn (17.1%). As this suggests the 
success of an economic sanctions regime on Iran requires common compliance strategies  
from Europe and China in the first instance. From 1 July 2012 Europe embargoed Iran’s 
energy exports that constituted 90% of trade. New measures followed from October 16 
2012 that included a freeze on assets of more than 30 Iranian companies in Iran's oil and 
gas sector, including the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker 
Company and the National Iranian Gas Company. The oil embargo was also extended to 
gas exports (Platt’s, 2012). On the same day that the freezing of assets was introduced by 
the EU, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei told the daily press briefing in 
Beijing that China opposed further sanctioning of Iran:  
 We oppose the imposition of unilateral sanctions on Iran and believe that using 
sanctions to exert pressure cannot fundamentally resolve the Iran nuclear issue. It 
can only make the situation more complex and intensify confrontation... We hope 
that all relevant parties can show flexibility, increase communication and push for a 
new round of talks as soon as possible (Reuters, 2012b). 
It seems therefore that the EU and China have reached a point of divergence over Iran: 
they share common views on non-proliferation; they have divergent views on who can 
enforce compliance, on whether international commerce should be impacted to ensure 
compliance, and on whether sanctions are a viable instrument for achieving compliance. 
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Normative convergence and resolution of the Iran case 
We can therefore evaluate the normative convergence of Europe and China in counter-
proliferation in the following ways:  
 1. What is the degree of international responsibility in the case, and who gets to select 
the case?  
China’s answer is broadly the United Nations Security Council and its reporting agencies 
such as the IAEA. Regional organisations willingness to nominate cases for international 
responsibility should also be taken in to account, provided they are nominating for their 
own region - regional organisations responsibility for other regions is much more limited. 
The EU is a strong supporter of the UN system also; but it does not confine its concerns to 
Europe and its neighbourhoods. The holistic conception of security adopted by the EU 
means that there is no aspect of global security that the EU considers beyond bounds; 
 2. What is the appropriate response of international actors to the security issue: what 
are the range of response methods?  
The European Union is an enthusiastic sanctioner. As the world’s largest economic 
organisation and commercial actor it has much more leverage in these areas than other 
countries or regions. Moreover, it seemingly finds it much easier to reach consensus on 
deployment of sanctions than on hard compliance by coercion. China dislikes negative 
sanctions and prefers positive incentives. The real divergence is that China has a different 
view of the relationship between national and international responsibilities. This means 
not only that China places national interests in development or strategic affairs ahead of 
international responsibilities but that national interest responsibilities are seen as 
inflexible requirements whereas international responsibilities are contingent possibilities. 
It is also the case that China views European or American deployment of normative claims 
as operating in parallel with the threat of the use of force, which rather undermines the 
assumption that these are sincerely normative;  
 3. What is an acceptable degree of intervention in normative power terms - to what 
degree should international actors be prepared to compel compliance on the dispute 
parties?  
The second nuclear age has transformed perspectives on counter-proliferation. The NPT 
was designed for the Cold War era in which a limited number of countries had technical 
capacity and geostrategic need for nuclear weapons. The second nuclear age has brought 
nuclear capacity within the range of countries that lack a broad technological base and 
introduced weapons into geostrategic environments that are much less stable than the 
Atlantic system. Most of this is taking place in close proximity to China making Chinese 
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contingent responses to proliferation difficult to rationalise. Europe seems determined to 
impose compliance on Iran, both in defence of non-proliferation norms and because the 
consequences for Middle East stability - and contagion towards Europe - of failed 
compliance are potentially enormous. China seems to have reached the point where it will 
not support sanctions either because these contradict its interpretation of the balance of 
national to international responsibilities or because China does not have confidence in 
sanctions to produce a resolution.  
 
Conclusion: evidence of normative convergence?   
 
It is not hard to identify the sources of disagreement in European and Chinese approaches 
to global and regional governance generally, and in the specifics of security governance. 
These are:  
i) The relationship between national interests and responsibilities and international 
interests and responsibilities are viewed differently. Only where there is clear 
correspondence between national interests and responsibilities and the international 
equivalents will China support international actions on these lines. In the case of Sudan 
national and international responsibilities have converged allowing China to take a 
common position with other countries, including Europe. In the case of Iran national and 
international interests and responsibilities have diverged leading to a divergent position to 
Europe;  
ii) Compliance options reflect development priorities. Europe, as the world’s largest and 
most sophisticated commercial alliance, can often sanction without facing very significant 
economic consequences (note Europe’s reluctance to deploy sanctions against Russia 
precisely because the economic and political costs for Europe would be high). China, as the 
world’s largest developing country, fears the rise of development constraints from the 
expansion of economic sanction regimes, whether applied bilaterally or multilaterally. 
China views political objectives as best met by political mechanisms not economic 
mechanisms. In essence, political objectives and mechanisms and economic objectives and 
mechanisms should not be confused;  
iii) In terms of the specifics of security governance, the following conclusions can be made. 
Europe and China engage more often in a widening range of security areas that extend 
from single issue cases, such as Syria, through regional security cases, such as Afghanistan-
Pakistan, to global level challenges of international and human security, such as second 
age nuclearisation, global terrorism, and human security consequences of climate change. 
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In terms of perspectives and cases there is no comprehensive mode of engagement 
between China and Europe, though this may emerge in time. At present Europe and China 
engage case by case with their postures largely determined by three questions: Who 
decides that the case meets the conditions for international responsibility? What are the 
range of mechanisms for intervention appropriate to the case? And what are the limits - 
political and practical - within which compliance can be imposed? Note that while China 
still favours a restrictive approach to intervention - derived from both its political identity 
and its practical interests - and Europe favours an expansive approach - for the same 
reasons - intervention itself is no longer an issue of fixed divergence. Thus the norms of 
security governance are mobile between China and Europe and in consequence mutual 
perceptions of identity as security actors are also mobile. There is still clear evidence of 
normative separation between the Chinese government and European governments but 
perspectives on normative power in security governance are closing, albeit with some 
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